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ABSTRACT 
 
In several recent cases the Supreme Court has endorsed the idea 
that there are some general limits to incorporation of European Union 
law in the United Kingdom.  The general limits stem from the Court’s 
interpretation of the European Communities Act 1972, the statute that 
grounds domestic effect of EU law, construed both in the light of 
ordinary canons of interpretation and in the light of fundamental 
principles. This raises the question what are the legal consequences 
when an EU measure violates one of those limits. In this paper, 
I propose an answer from the perspective of what a domestic court 
ought to do. My aim is to develop the legal position emerging from 
Assange, HS2, Pham, and Miller. I argue that sometimes UK courts 
are under a duty not to apply EU law. However, the circumstances 
where this is the case are even more limited than the focus on the 
general limits of incorporation of EU law may suggest. In particular, 
fundamental principles of UK law may work to expand the scope of 
domestic effect of EU law. I want to stress that neither the cited cases, 
nor the present paper, take a position of hostility towards EU law. The 
following discussion makes it clear that both EU law and UK law have 
many devices to avoid conflict and those devices need to be exhausted 
before a court concludes that it is under a duty not to apply EU law. 
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I. Introduction 
In several recent cases the Supreme Court has endorsed the idea that 
there are some general limits of incorporation of European Union 
law in the United Kingdom.2 The general limits stem from the 
                                                      
2 Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2012] UKSC 22; [2012] 2 AC 
471 [175]-[176] (Baroness Hale DPSC), [208]-[217] (Lord Mance JSC); R 
(HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3; 
[2014] 1 WLR 324 [79] (Lord Reed JSC), [207]-[208] (Lord Neuberger PSC 
and Lord Mance JSC); Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2015] UKSC 19; [2015] 1 WLR 1591 [90]-[91] (Lord Mance JSC); R (Miller 
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Court’s interpretation of the European Communities Act 1972 
(‘ECA’), the statute that grounds domestic effect of EU law, 
construed both in the light of ordinary canons of interpretation and 
in the light of fundamental principles of UK law. This raises the 
question what are the legal consequences when an EU measure 
violates one of those limits. In this paper, I propose an answer from 
the perspective of what a domestic court ought to do. My aim is to 
develop the legal position emerging from Assange, HS2, Pham, and 
Miller. I argue that sometimes UK courts are under a duty not to 
apply EU law. However, the circumstances where this is the case are 
even more limited than the focus on the general limits of 
incorporation of EU law may suggest. In particular, fundamental 
principles of UK law may work to expand the scope of domestic effect 
of EU law. I want to stress that neither the cited cases, nor the present 
paper, take a position of hostility towards EU law. The following 
discussion makes it clear that both EU law and UK law have many 
devices to avoid conflict and those devices need to be exhausted 
before a court concludes that it is under a duty not to apply EU law. 
Given the result of the Brexit referendum and triggering of the 
Article 50 process by the Prime Minister, the UK will most likely leave 
the EU within the next two years. However, as long as the ECA 1972 
is in force and the UK is a member, the legal position discussed in 
this paper is not affected. Also, the most probable scenarios for a 
potential post-Brexit relationship between the UK and the EU would 
involve some incorporation of EU law, even if indirectly.3 More 
generally, the point made in this paper is applicable a fortiori to all 
incorporated international law, including the European Convention 
of Human Rights and other treaties. EU law is currently incorporated 
in UK law in an unprecedentedly strong way. If there may be a 
judicial duty not to apply EU law, then the same applies even more 
forcefully to other international legal regimes. The converse point I 
make in this paper is also true for other treaties: UK fundamental 
                                                      
and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] 
UKSC 5 [67], [99]. 
3 See, e.g., House of Commons Library, Leaving the EU (Research Paper 
13/42, 1 July 2013); Ciarán Burke, Ólafur Ísberg Hannesson and Kristin 
Bansgsund, ‘Life on the Edge: EFTA and the EEA as a Future for the UK in 
Europe’ (2016) 22 European Public Law 69. 
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rights and principles may extend the scope of effect in UK law of 
those other treaties. 
The structure of my argument is as follows. I begin by 
introducing the notion of the general limits of incorporation of EU 
law in the UK (sec. II). To do that, I discuss the structure of the 
scheme of incorporation of EU law and the importance of the proper 
interpretation of the ECA 1972. I present the interpretation suggested 
by the Supreme Court in Assange, HS2, Pham, and Miller and then 
defend it against the charge that it is incompatible with parliamentary 
sovereignty. On this reading of the ECA, the general limits of 
incorporation leave a sphere of uncertainty. I propose that in practice 
this uncertainty should be resolved with respect to a strong domestic 
presumption of effect of EU law in UK law.  
Subsequently, in sec. III, I discuss how even when an EU measure 
clearly violates one of the general limits of incorporation it still may 
be the case that at least some UK courts have a duty to apply that 
measure. I argue that domestic principles and doctrines (e.g. the 
separation of powers, the rule of law, the doctrine of precedent, but 
also more mundane rules of procedure) may make it the case that UK 
law gives effect to EU law beyond the general limits of incorporation. 
Structurally, this point follows Thoburn, HS2, and Miller in 
recognizing that fundamental principles are highly relevant to 
interpretation of the ECA 1972. I stress an underappreciated point 
that fundamental principles may push in both ways: to limit and to 
extend domestic effect of EU law.  
In sec. IV, I show the tools EU law itself possesses to mitigate the 
risk of a domestically irresolvable conflict between EU law and 
national law. I discuss the flexibility EU law shows in accommodating 
constitutional fundamentals of domestic law, as well as the 
self-controlling aspect of the scope of judicial review of secondary EU 
law and acts of EU institutions. I accept that in most situations where 
a UK court may be inclined not to apply EU law it will have a duty 
first to issue a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (‘CJEU’). Also, I stress that even though UK law 
does not ground a power for domestic courts to invalidate EU law 
(merely a duty not to apply it in some circumstances), UK courts have 
an EU-law power to suspend enforcement of EU measures. 
Concluding, given the seriousness of the general grounds of non-
incorporation of EU law and the safeguards present in UK law and in 
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EU law, I reject the view that a court could do something other than 
to act on the duty not to apply EU law once it concludes that it is 
all-things-considered under such duty.  
II. The general limits of incorporation of EU law: Assange, 
HS2, Pham, and Miller 
The general approach the law of the United Kingdom takes towards 
other legal orders, or to non-UK sources of law, has been described 
by UK courts as ‘dualist’.4 On this model, foreign or international law 
does not affect rights and duties in domestic law unless it has an 
anchor in domestic law.5 That anchor can be as weak and general as, 
for instance, the principle that the courts ought to develop the 
common law consistently with international law.6 If a foreign or 
international legal norm does not have an anchor in UK law, then 
there is no basis for a UK court to help itself to it. Without an anchor, 
the norm in question is not what UK courts have a permission to 
recognize as law. However, it is also true that in an important sense, 
for a domestic court, EU law is not like any other foreign or 
international legal order. The main anchor of EU law in UK law, 
statutory incorporation through the European Communities Act 
1972, is stronger and broader than any other recognition of effect of 
                                                      
4 For mentions of ‘dualism’, see e.g. Pham (n 2) [80] (Lord Mance JSC); R 
(Wang Yam) v Central Criminal Court and Another [2015] UKSC 76 [35]-
[38] (Lord Mance JSC); Miller (n 2) [55], [57], [79]. For the general legal 
position see also, e.g. International Tin Council [1990] 2 AC 418 (500) (Lord 
Hoffmann); R v Lyons (Isidore Jack) (No 3) [2003] 1 AC 976 [38]-[40] (Lord 
Hoffmann); Chester v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 63; [2014] 
AC 271 [119] (Lord Sumption JSC). 
5 This characterisation is crude, but it will suffice for my purposes. On the 
notion of dualism in general, see Pavlos Eleftheriadis, ‘Pluralism and 
Integrity’ (2010) 23 Ratio Juris 365, 368–70. See also Philip Sales and Joanne 
Clement, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts: The Developing 
Framework’ (2008) 124 LQR 388. 
6 See, e.g., R (on the application of JS) v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2015] UKSC 16; [2015] 1 WLR 1449 [241] (Lord Kerr JSC); Lyons 
(n 4) [13] (Lord Bingham). 
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non-UK law in UK law as emphasized by the Supreme Court in 
Miller.7  
Given the ECA’s role as the fundamental statutory gateway for 
domestic effect of EU law, proper interpretation of the legislative 
choice made by Parliament in enacting the ECA is clearly crucial for 
the issue of limits of that effect. In this section, I present and accept 
for the sake of my broader argument the interpretation of the ECA 
that emerges from recent Supreme Court judgments in Assange, HS2, 
Pham and Miller. I only defend this reading of the ECA against the 
charge that it is incompatible with parliamentary sovereignty. 
I conclude the section by discussing what I see as an important 
consequence of the strength of incorporation of EU law by the ECA: 
the presumption of domestic effect of EU law. Both the general limits 
of EU law and the presumption of effect are important for the later 
argument. 
Before I turn to the issue of interpretation of the ECA, I want to 
note a controversy that, in the light of recent case law, may now be 
considered as historical (though it does not mean that it will not 
return). After HS2, there can be little doubt that, from the perspective 
of domestic constitutional law, EU law does not affect rights and 
duties in UK law independent from and in precedence to every 
domestic statutory rule.8 On the rival view, EU law derives its force 
                                                      
7 The Miller majority made this point so emphatically that their phrasing 
was arguably overly and unnecessarily strong (e.g. ‘EU law [is constituted] 
as an independent and overriding source of domestic law’ and ‘[EU law has] 
an overriding supremacy in the hierarchy of domestic law sources’) see 
Miller (n 2) [65], [81], [90]. For criticism of the Miller majority’s excessive 
rhetoric, see Mikolaj Barczentewicz, ‘Miller, Statutory Interpretation, and 
the True Place of EU Law in UK Law’ (unpublished manuscript, 2017); 
Richard Ekins, ‘Constitutional Practice and Principle in the Article 50 
Litigation’ (2017) 133 LQR forthcoming XXX; Mark Elliott, ‘Analysis: The 
Supreme Court’s Judgment in Miller’ (Public Law for Everyone, 25 January 
2017) <https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2017/01/25/analysis-the-
supreme-courts-judgment-in-miller/>. For a defence, see Alison L Young, 
‘R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union: Thriller or 
Vanilla?’ [2017] European Law Review forthcoming. 
8 See HS2 (n 2) [79] (Lord Reed JSC), [207]-[208] (Lord Neuberger PSC and 
Lord Mance JSC). For commentary, see Lord Reed JSC, ‘EU Law and the 
Supreme Court’ (The Sir Thomas More Lecture, 14 November 2014) 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-141114.pdf> accessed 5 
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from the common law and may exert it even after repeal of the 
incorporating provisions of the ECA.9 Importantly, even Laws LJ – 
someone who could be seen as sympathetic to the common law view 
– accepted in Thoburn that there may be limits to the scope of 
incorporation of EU law in UK law and that such limits are a matter 
of the proper interpretation of the ECA 1972.10 Parliament itself made 
it clear in section 18 of the European Union Act 2011 (‘EUA’), 
perhaps unnecessarily, that EU law has direct effect in the UK only 
when it is incorporated by domestic statute.11 Most recently, in its 
Miller judgment the Supreme Court confirmed the crucial 
dependence of continued domestic effect of EU law on the ECA 
1972.12 
                                                      
October 2016; Paul Craig, ‘Constitutionalising Constitutional Law: HS2’ 
[2014] Public Law 373; Mark Elliott, ‘Constitutional Legislation, European 
Union Law and the Nature of the United Kingdom’s Contemporary 
Constitution’ (2014) 10 European Constitutional Law Review 379; Lady 
Hale, ‘UK Constitutionalism on the March?’ (2014) 19 Judicial Review 201 
[31]-[34]; Alison L Young and Stephen J Dimelow, ‘High Speed Rail, 
Europe and the Constitution’ (2014) 73 CLJ 234; Mikolaj Barczentewicz, 
‘“Constitutional Statutes” still Alive’ (2014) 130 LQR 557; Christopher 
Sargeant, ‘Factortame Revisited and the Constitution Reimagined: The UK 
Supreme Court Take Its First Ride on the HS2 Rail-Line’ (2015) 5 The UK 
Supreme Court Annual Review 157; Michael Gordon, Parliamentary 
Sovereignty in the UK Constitution (Hart Publishing 2015) 187–91. 
9 For a helpful overview of the rival view, see Graham Gee and Alison L 
Young, ‘Regaining Sovereignty? Brexit, the UK Parliament and the 
Common Law’ (2016) 22 European Public Law 131, 142–43. 
10 For the original point, see Thoburn v Sunderland CC [2002] EWHC 195 
(Admin); [2003] QB 151 [69]. For evidence of its acceptance, see HS2 (n 2) 
[79] (Lord Reed JSC), [207]-[208] (Lord Neuberger PSC and Lord Mance 
JSC); Pham (n 2) [82], [90] (Lord Mance JSC); see also Craig (n 8) 378–79; 
Elliott (n 8) 386–87, 389; Sargeant (n 8) 166. 
11 See Paul Craig, ‘The European Union Act 2011: Locks, Limits and 
Legality’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1881, 1903-04; Michael 
Dougan and Michael Gordon, ‘The United Kingdom’s European Union 
Act 2011: “who Won the Bloody War Anyway?”’ (2012) 37 European Law 
Review 3, 8.  
12 Miller (n 2) [60], [66]-[67]. 
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A. Interpreting the ECA 
It is now time to consider two possible ways of interpreting the ECA 
1972. On the view endorsed in the Thoburn-Miller line of cases, there 
are general limits to incorporation of EU law through the ECA 
(sec. II.A.1). It is true that the interpretative method employed to 
identify some of the general limits of incorporation gives cause for 
concern from the perspective of parliamentary sovereignty, but I 
think this concern may be addressed (sec. II.A.2).  
1. From Thoburn to Assange, HS2, Pham and Miller: the limited 
incorporation view  
The genealogy of the limited incorporation view adopted most 
recently by the Supreme Court in Pham and Miller may be traced to 
the Court of Appeal judgment in the ‘Metric Martyrs’ case 
(Thoburn).13 In that case, Laws LJ argued that if ‘a European measure 
was seen to be repugnant to a [UK] fundamental or constitutional 
right’ that there could be a question, to be resolved as a matter of UK 
law, ‘whether the general words of the ECA were sufficient to 
incorporate the measure and give it overriding effect in domestic 
law’.14 The reasoning is based, at least structurally, on the principle of 
legality as presented by Lord Hoffmann in Simms.15  
On this view, Acts of Parliament should not be construed as 
abrogating fundamental principles of profound ‘normative 
importance’ (to use Paul Craig’s phrase16) without particularly strong 
evidence to that effect. When legislating to change the law, 
Parliament should be taken to be aware of the law as it is at the 
moment of change and of relative importance of different elements 
of the law.17 Parliament should not be presumed by those tasked with 
authoritative determination of the content of the law to be reckless, 
                                                      
13 Pham (n 2); Thoburn v. Sunderland C.C. (n 10). 
14 Thoburn v. Sunderland C.C. (n 10) [69]. 
15 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms and 
another [2000] 2 AC 115 (131). 
16 Craig (n 8) 389–90. 
17 See, e.g., Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 
32; [2002] NI 390 [11] (Lord Bingham); AXA General Insurance Ltd & 
Others v The Lord Advocate & Others [2011] UKSC 46, [2011] 3 WLR 871 
[152]-[153] (Lord Reed). 
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to be like a bull in a china shop, demolishing foundational elements 
of the constitutional structure left and right by mere implication.18 
Hence, the courts should conclude that Parliament intended to repeal 
or to derogate from a legal rule of special normative importance, only 
when Parliament uses ‘express language or necessary implication’ 
(Lord Hoffmann).19 There is considerable merit to a cautious 
approach to this interpretative device, given that it could, when 
misused, produce results that go against the legislative choice 
Parliament did make. I come back to this issue later (sec. II.A.2).  
Laws LJ repeated the Thoburn point in his later judgments in 
Youssef and in GI,20 as well as extra-judicially.21 The Supreme Court 
took it up for the first time in HS2, citing Thoburn, and then from 
slightly different perspectives in Pham, citing GI, and in Miller.22 In 
HS2, Lord Reed JSC endorsed the argument that EU law, including 
the principle of supremacy, derives its effect in UK law through the 
ECA 1972 and any conflicts between constitutional principles and 
EU law are ‘to be resolved by our courts as an issue arising under the 
constitutional law of the United Kingdom’.23 In the same case, Lord 
Neuberger PSC and Lord Mance JSC raised the possibility that the 
ECA does not modify at least some fundamental constitutional 
principles.24  
The focus of the Miller judgment was not directed towards the 
limits of incorporation of EU law, but towards the broad and 
unprecedented extent of incorporation. Hence, it is not perfectly 
clear whether the Miller judgment was intended in any way to depart 
from the position on limits of incorporation expressed in HS2 or in 
                                                      
18 See also Geoffrey Lindell, ‘The Statutory Protection of Rights and 
Parliamentary Sovereignty: Guidance from the United Kingdom?’ (2006) 
17 Public Law Review 188, 197–98; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary 
Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (CUP 2010) 312–13. 
19 Simms (n 15) (131).  
20 He did so without referring to Thoburn expressly; R (Youssef) v Secretary 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2013] EWCA Civ 1302; 
[2014] QB 728 [26]; R (on the application of GI (Sudan)) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 867; [2013] QB 1008 [43]. 
21 John Laws, The Common Law Constitution (CUP 2014) 11–14, 64–71. 
22 HS2 (n 2) [208] (Lord Neuberger PSC and Lord Mance JSC); Pham (n 2) 
[75] (Lord Mance JSC); Miller (n 2) [66]-[67]. 
23 HS2 (n 2) [79]. 
24 ibid [207]-[208]. 
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Pham. The Miller judgment cites both the Thoburn and HS2 
statements that I rely on.25 However, it only highlights the aspect that 
continued domestic effect of EU law is tied to continued validity of 
the ECA 1972 and that it is possible for Parliament to legislate to 
‘[alter] the domestic constitutional status of EU institutions or of EU 
law’.26 This is consistent with other cases I discuss. Given positive 
references to Thoburn and HS2 in Miller, I think it is proper to read 
Miller as endorsing or at least as not departing from the previous 
views the Supreme Court expressed on limits of incorporation of EU 
law. 
Not all instances of judicial recognition of general limits of 
incorporation of EU law involve the fundamental rights and 
fundamental principles reasoning of Thoburn and HS2. The already 
mentioned judgment of Lord Mance JSC in Pham, as well as his 
earlier judgment in Assange, rely on more ordinary methods of 
statutory interpretation to identify the limits. In Assange, Lord 
Mance JSC notes that the ECA expressly excludes some parts of the 
EU Treaties from the scope of incorporation.27 Hence, both the 
excluded Treaty provisions and the measures adopted pursuant to 
those provisions are not incorporated by the ECA. Express exclusion 
in the ECA is a general limit of incorporation. Interestingly, Lord 
Mance JSC rejected some ‘back-door’ methods of incorporation for 
those provisions, suggested by the counsel, like e.g. the binding effect 
of judgments of European courts interpreting the excluded EU law 
(under section 3(1) of the ECA) or the principle of sincere 
cooperation (now Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union).28 
Even though it is not my aim here to defend the specific general limits 
identified in the case law, I wish to note that I consider the position 
in Assange as eminently plausible. 
In Pham, Lord Mance JSC stressed that EU law and acts of EU 
institutions (including judgments of the CJEU) may be set aside if a 
UK court concludes that they were ultra vires of the EU Treaties.29  It 
is true that the ECA does not provide for this general limit of 
incorporation expressly. Hence, I will mention briefly a possible 
                                                      
25 Miller (n 2) [66]-[67]. 
26 ibid [67]. 
27 Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority (n 2) [209]-[218]. 
28 ibid [212], [215]. 
29 Pham (n 2) [90]. 
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interpretative argument underlying the Pham point (Lord Mance JSC 
did not provide one). The ECA refers to rights, powers, and so on 
‘created or arising by or under the Treaties’ (section 2(1)). Plausibly, 
there could be an EU measure so clearly ultra vires of EU powers that 
it could not be considered as ‘created or arising by or under the 
Treaties’. I admit that there is a need for subtlety and restraint on the 
part of domestic public authorities in identifying EU measures as 
ultra vires. Lord Mance’s JSC discussion in Pham is very attentive to 
this point.30 However, for the purposes of this discussion all that 
matters is that it is possible for such a case of non-incorporation to 
arise.  
The contrary position, that the ECA incorporates into UK law 
everything coming from the EU with no limits whatsoever requires a 
strained and implausible reading of the ECA. The question is not 
whether the Court of Justice is likely, for example, to uphold EU 
Commission’s decision addressed to the UK placing all UK armed 
forces under EU command (which would be manifestly ultra vires of 
the EU Treaties). The question is whether a decision like that would 
be incorporated in UK law by the ECA 1972. Such result would be so 
unreasonable and undermine the basic structure of the UK 
constitution so much (by recognizing unlimited legislative power of 
the EU), that it cannot be accepted that it is what Parliament 
intended.31 Hence, not everything coming from EU institutions is 
‘created or arising by or under the Treaties’ under section 2(1) ECA. 
Where exactly the line is to be drawn is a matter I do not need to 
resolve here.  
2. Fundamental principles and parliamentary sovereignty 
There is an important concern that applies only to the limits of 
incorporation grounded in the fundamental principles reasoning, 
but not to other limits like like the ultra vires limit from Pham or 
express exclusion of parts of EU law in Assange. In his recent book 
on parliamentary sovereignty, Michael Gordon suggested (writing 
before Pham) that the obiter dicta from HS2 I referred to above are 
                                                      
30 ibid [90]-[91]. 
31 For the relevant principles of statutory interpretation, see, e.g., R (on the 
application of Edison First Power Ltd) v Central Valuation Officer [2003] 
UKHL 20; [2003] 4 All ER 209 [116]-[117] (Lord Millett); Bennion on 
Statutory Interpretation (6th edn, Lexis Nexis 2013) ss. 312-314. 
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unsound, because the principle of supremacy of EU law ‘has domestic 
effect in UK by virtue of section 2(4) of the ECA’ and thus, pace Lord 
Reed JSC, it could resolve conflicts between UK fundamental 
constitutional principles and EU law.32 This is so as ‘the notion of 
supremacy of EU law is implicit in the instruction which Parliament, 
via the ECA, has given to the UK courts to give effect to EU law over 
contrary domestic norms’.33 True, ‘this instruction can be revoked,’ 
but ‘this can only be achieved by further legislation’.34 In effect, 
Gordon claims that the fundamental principles reasoning of Thoburn 
and HS2 does not ground any general limits of incorporation of EU 
law.35 
This is important because it would be a violation of parliamentary 
sovereignty for a court to refuse to apply EU law inconsistent with 
some alleged fundamental principle when that principle was not in 
fact implied by Parliament that enacted the ECA 1972. Despite some 
judicial and academic voices to the contrary,36 ‘Parliamentary 
sovereignty is a fundamental principle of the UK constitution’.37 As 
Lord Mance JSC said in Pham: 
unless and until the rule of recognition by which we shape 
our decisions is altered, we must view the United Kingdom 
as independent, Parliament as sovereign and European law 
                                                      
32 Gordon (n 8) 188. 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid. 
35 I am grateful to Michael Gordon for clarifying in private conversation 
that he endorses the other grounds of (what I refer to as) general limits of 
incorporation discussed in this paper. 
36 See, e.g., HWR Wade, ‘Sovereignty—Revolution or Evolution?’ (1996) 
112 LQR 568; Stuart Lakin, ‘Debunking the Idea of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty: The Controlling Factor of Legality in the British Constitution’ 
(2008) 28 OJLS 709; NW Barber, ‘The Afterlife of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty’ (2011) 9 ICON 144. See also Jackson v Attorney-General [2005] 
UKHL 56; [2006] 1 AC 262 [102] (Lord Steyn); AXA (n 17) [50] (Lord Hope 
DPSC). 
37 Miller (n 2) [43]. See also, e.g., Richard Ekins, ‘Acts of Parliament and the 
Parliament Acts’ (2007) 123 LQR 91, 100–106; Colin Turpin and Adam 
Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution (CUP 2011) 95–96, 355; 
Michael Gordon, ‘The UK’s Fundamental Constitutional Principle: Why 
the UK Parliament Is Still Sovereign and Why It Still Matters’ (2015) 26 
King’s Law Journal 229.   
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as part of domestic law because Parliament has so willed. 
The question how far Parliament has so willed is thus 
determined by construing the 1972 Act.38 
Gordon’s challenge is as follows: 
The idea that the courts might consider reading limits into 
ECA – even where their intention is to avoid being engaged 
in challenged to ‘the whole legitimacy of Parliamentary 
democracy as it presently operates’ – should therefore be 
approached with great caution, for to do so would exceed 
their constitutional authority.39 
There are good reasons to be very careful about the fundamental 
rights and fundamental principles type of reasoning in statutory 
interpretation.40 There is a non-trivial risk for judges to encroach on 
legislative choice when engaged in that sort of argumentation. 
However, this concern may be addressed. When is the use of 
fundamental rights and principles reasoning legitimate? 
For a court to use a fundamental right or principle to interpret a 
statute inconsistently with its literal meaning (and, especially, 
to disapply a statutory provision), the court has to be able to attribute 
a standing commitment not to abrogate the fundamental right or 
principle to Parliament that enacted the statute.41 For such 
                                                      
38 Pham (n 2) [80]. In Miller, the Supreme Court stressed that the rule of 
recognition has not changed; Miller (n 2) [60]. Even those who believe that 
parliamentary sovereignty has now been qualified in an important sense, 
endorse the interpretation of the ECA 1972 according to which there are 
limits to incorporation of EU law; see, e.g., Laws (n 21) 11–14, 64–71; Elliott 
(n 8) 392.  
39 Gordon (n 8) 188 (footnotes omitted); citing HS2 (n 2) [210]. 
40 See, e.g., Goldsworthy (n 18) 315–18; Gordon (n 8) 188–91, 230–35; 
Gordon (n 37) 240; Philip Sales, ‘Rights and Fundamental Rights in English 
Law’ (2016) 75 Cambridge Law Journal 86, 92, 98–99. But conf. Elliott (n 8) 
390–92; Craig (n 8) 384–89. 
41 As Sales LJ suggested, writing extra-judicially about fundamental rights 
in general:  
I suggest that the courts should only identify a fundamental right or 
interest for the purposes of the principle of legality if it is plausible to 
infer that Parliament as a collective body itself recognises such a right 
or interest and may thus be taken to have legislated on the assumption 
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attribution to be possible, it must be the case that the right or 
principle in question was accepted as fundamental by the political 
community at the moment of enactment of the statute. What is more, 
it must be that there was an overwhelming consensus over the 
strength and the scope of application of the right or principle. 
Consensus, that in a case like the one before the court, the right or 
principle would apply and be weighty enough to override conflicting 
considerations.  
To give an example: it is not enough that the political community 
of 1972 accepted the fundamental principle of non-justiciability of 
the parliamentary law-making process. As Lord Reed JSC noted 
extra-judicially, ‘[i]t would be a mistake to think that Parliamentary 
proceedings are a no-go area for the courts’.42 If the ECA 1972 is really 
to be read, as suggested in HS2, as not incorporating EU law that 
requires courts to pass judgment on the quality of parliamentary 
scrutiny of a bill, then we must establish that the principle accepted 
in 1972 covered such a case. It is not required that anyone consciously 
contemplated this particular case in 1972.43 Nevertheless, one needs 
some evidence that the principle-as-accepted had the scope and 
strength that would allow it to control interpretation of the statute 
being interpreted in a way that would make a difference in the case. 
The Supreme Court in HS2 provides some such evidence, in the form 
of court judgments and canonical writings (Blackstone).44 
Importantly, neither case law nor scholarly publications themselves 
are constitutive of the relevant fact of acceptance of the principle in 
                                                      
that it applies (unless clearly abrogated by the legislation under 
review). 
Sales (n 40) 99. Jeffrey Goldsworthy argued along similar lines: 
… if the orthodox justification of the presumptions is taken seriously, 
the relevant question is what rights were generally accepted as 
fundamental when the statute in question was enacted. 
Goldsworthy (n 18) 306. See also ibid ch 7.III; ch 9.II-III. 
42 Lord Reed JSC (n 8) 9. See also Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Proportionality and 
Parliamentary Debates: Exploring Some Forbidden Territory’ (2014) 34 
OJLS 443. 
43 Danny Nicol’s work suggests that Parliament likely did not form a view 
on constitutional consequences of the ECA 1972 during the legislative 
proceedings; see EC Membership and the Judicialization of British Politics 
(OUP 2001) ch 4. 
44 HS2 (n 2) [203]-[204] (Lord Neuberger PSC and Lord Mance JSC). 
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1972. However, they may provide reliable, though defeasible, 
evidence of what the political community accepted as fundamental.  
The approach suggested here may in many cases prove very 
demanding and it is likely that often there will not be a sufficient 
evidence of consensus over a fundamental right or principle at the 
time of enactment of a statute. This will be especially so if the 
advocates approach this framework seriously and strive to provide 
the courts with good evidence of a lack of consensus. Without the 
required consensus over a particular principle, there would be a 
strong reason to think that the courts are wrong in attributing to 
Parliament that enacted a statute in question an intent not to 
derogate from the right or principle. Therefore, there is space for 
legitimate use of fundamental rights and principles in interpreting 
the ECA 1972, but – as the Supreme Court noted in HS2 – a much 
more detailed argument about specific rights and principles is 
required.45  
Even if Gordon is correct and the ECA does ground an even more 
far-reaching domestic principle of supremacy of EU law than the 
cited case law suggests, it does not follow that UK judges are always 
to give effect to EU law. Gordon himself gives an example when they 
could do otherwise.46 He accepts that if, contrary to the conclusions 
in HS2,47 EU law requires domestic courts to review the quality of 
parliamentary scrutiny of a bill, then it still may be open for UK 
courts to refuse to do so by claiming that this is outside of their 
jurisdiction (which is limited by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688).48 
It is true, as Lord Mance JSC noted in Chester, that the CJEU said in 
Kücükdeveci, that a national court is to provide legal protection under 
EU law to individuals ‘within the limits of its jurisdiction’.49 However, 
it is still a matter of controversy in EU law whether UK courts are 
under an EU-law duty to invent a domestic judicial power (like the 
power to grant interim relief against the Crown in Factortame) in a 
                                                      
45 ibid [208] (Lord Neuberger PSC and Lord Mance JSC). 
46 Gordon (n 8) 188. 
47 HS2 (n 2) [116] (Lord Reed JSC), [209] (Lord Neuberger PSC and Lord 
Mance JSC). 
48 This is not to say that Gordon does not allow for other scenarios, like the 
application of Chester along the lines suggested below in sec. III.A.  
49 Chester (n 4) [72], [74]; Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci [2010] ECR I-00365; 
[2010] All ER (EC) 867, para 51. 
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situation when UK law does not provide any judicial procedure to 
review the level of parliamentary scrutiny and if such scrutiny is 
required by EU law (see also sec. IV).50 Hence, by saying that UK 
courts could dodge the problem by declaring it non-justiciable, 
Gordon admits that they could do something EU law arguably 
requires them not to do. And this amounts to admitting that the 
domestic principle of supremacy of EU law is much more limited 
than the correlate EU principle of supremacy (in combination with 
the EU principle of effectiveness). 
Alternatively, perhaps Gordon would prefer to say that EU law 
principles of supremacy and of effectiveness are still fully 
incorporated into UK law by the ECA 1972, because all of EU law is 
so incorporated, but there is a conflict of domestic legal norms. And 
it happens that in a conflict between some other UK constitutional 
principles and the domestic principle of supremacy of EU law the 
latter loses out. Hence, the EU principle of effectiveness is 
incorporated, but in some cases cannot be given effect by UK courts. 
If the interpretation of the ECA 1972 accepted here is correct, i.e. 
if there may be EU measures that are not incorporated in UK law 
through the ECA, then that provides a strong reason to think that the 
duty not to apply EU law is consistent with parliamentary 
sovereignty.51 This point is underestimated, because given the recent 
talk of the Supreme Court’s possible role as a national ‘constitutional 
court’ vis-à-vis EU law52 and the references the Supreme Court itself 
                                                      
50 See, e.g., Case C-432/05 Unibet v Justitiekanslern [2007] ECR I-2271, 
paras 40-47; Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:625, para 103-104 (‘… only if the structure of the domestic 
legal system concerned were such that there was no remedy making it 
possible, even indirectly, to ensure respect for the rights which individuals 
derive from European Union law …’). 
51 I use ‘EU measures’ as a shorthand for any unit of legal content, including 
the EU Treaties (and norms contained therein), decisions of EU courts (and 
distinct points of law made in them), binding acts of other EU institutions 
(and norms within them), and so on. By employing this stipulative notion 
I aim to avoid commitment to any conception of individuation of legal 
norms (of legal content). 
52 See, e.g., ‘Oral Evidence Session with Rt Hon. Michael Gove MP, Lord 
Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice’ (The House of Lords Select 
Constitution Committee, 2 December 2015) 
<https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-
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made to judgments of the German Constitutional Court, notably in 
HS2,53 there is a temptation to jump to a conclusion that what must 
be at stake here is whether the Supreme Court already is or should 
become a constitutional court with a power to conduct 
constitutionality review of primary legislation. But this is a non 
sequitur. Admittedly, the ‘constitutional court’ parlance is 
infelicitous. Nevertheless, once one accepts that the gateway for 
domestic effect of EU law that Parliament opened through the ECA 
1972 is a limited one, there is a clear difference between not applying 
an EU measure that does not fit in the domestic gate and going 
against Parliamentary intent in a continental-style constitutionality 
review of Acts of Parliament. Recognition of the existence of a 
judicial duty not to apply EU law, or even strengthening such duty 
through new legislation,54 do not necessarily impinge on 
parliamentary sovereignty. 
B. Taking stock: the general limits 
It is true that the language used by the ECA 1972 is susceptible to be 
read literally as providing for effect of all EU measures that purport 
to be effective domestically.55 Section 2(1) mentions ‘[a]ll such rights 
…’. Section 2(4) talks about ‘any enactment’ of the domestic law-
maker. Similarly, section 3(1) uses ‘all’ and ‘any’ liberally. However, 
the interpretation adopted in the cited case law does not rely only on 
literal reading of the ECA, it also employs other methods of statutory 
interpretation. The general limits of incorporation of EU law 
identified in the case law may be placed in different places on a 
plausibility spectrum. It is much harder to resist the Assange 
conclusion on express exclusions of some Treaty provisions in the 
ECA than it is to resist particular applications of the fundamental 
                                                      
committees/constitution/AnnualOralEvidence2014-15/CC021215-
LC.pdf> accessed 15 May 2016, question 9. 
53 HS2 (n 2) [202] (Lord Neuberger PSC and Lord Mance JSC). 
54 Jeff King, ‘On the Proposal for a UK Constitutional Court’ (UK 
Constitutional Law Blog, 8 February 2016) 
<https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/02/08/jeff-king-on-the-proposal-
for-a-uk-constitutional-court/> accessed 18 May 2016. 
55 Lord Reed JSC mentioned that possibility in his extra-judicial 
commentary on HS2, see (n 8) 8. 
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principles reasoning from HS2 (even if the general interpretative 
method is sound there is bound to be disagreement over which 
constitutional principles the ECA does not derogate from). 
I do not argue here for a catalogue of general limits of 
incorporation of EU law in the UK. For the purposes of my argument 
I accept that Lord Mance JSC is correct in the cited dicta in Assange, 
HS2 (with Lord Neuberger PSC) and Pham. The following list 
summarizes the preceding discussion and provides an illustration of 
the spectrum of the possible general limits of incorporation of EU law 
based on proposals voiced in case law and in academic literature: 
(1) express exclusions in the ECA 1972 (Assange);56 
(2) fundamental rights and fundamental constitutional 
principles that Parliament that enacted the ECA 1972 did not 
intend to derogate from (HS2);57 
(3) clear violations of the limits of the EU Treaties, even by 
the CJEU, i.e. the ultra vires limit (Pham);58 
(4) potential Acts of Parliament introducing EU-incompatible 
domestic rules ‘notwithstanding’ the ECA or EU law 
(Miller);59 
(5) potential express repeal of the incorporating provisions of the 
ECA 1972 (Miller).60 
I adopted a convention of referring to them as ‘general’ limits of 
incorporation to reflect the fact that they are not 
                                                      
56 Assange v Swedish Proscecution Authority [2012] UKSC 22; [2012] 2 AC 
471 [209]-[217]. See also Bucnys v Ministry of Justice, Lithuania [2013] 
UKSC 71; [2014] AC 480 [20] (Lord Mance JSC); Lord Mance JSC, 
‘Destruction or Metamorphosis of the Legal Order?’ (World Policy 
Conference, Monaco, 14 December 2013) 10 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131214.pdf> accessed 7 May 
2016; Lady Hale (n 8) [33]. 
57 HS2 (n 2) [207]-[208]; Lord Mance JSC (n 56) 10; Lady Hale (n 8) [31]-
[32]. 
58 Pham (n 2) [90]. 
59 Miller (n 2) [67]. See also Turpin and Tomkins (n 37) 355–56; Gordon (n 
8) 188. For other judicial endorsements of this position see, e.g., Macarthys 
v Smith [1979] 1 WLR 1189; [1979] ICR 785 (789) (Lord Denning MR); 
Thoburn v. Sunderland C.C. (n 10) [63] (Laws LJ). But see Craig considering 
a possibility that the Supreme Court might not give effect to such domestic 
statute, Craig (n 11) 1905. See also Lady Hale (n 8) [27]. 
60 See, e.g., Miller (n 2) [67]; Craig (n 11) 1905. 
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all-things-considered limits. In other words, it could be that an EU 
measure that violates one or more of the general limits is nevertheless 
still effective in UK law (see sec. III). 
Importantly for the main argument of this paper, as Lord 
Mance JSC stressed in Pham and as the majority of the Supreme 
Court stated repeatedly in Miller, there is significant breadth and 
force to the incorporating provisions of the ECA.61 Also, arguably 
there is a duty of mutual respect between domestic authorities and 
EU institutions.62 It should be then clear that the limited 
incorporation reading of the ECA does not entail any position of 
hostility towards the EU. What is more, this reading is consistent 
with the view that the ECA grounds a presumption of effect of EU 
law, to which I now turn. 
C. The domestic presumption of effect EU law 
The relevant provisions of the ECA that provide for effect of EU law 
in UK law are very broad, though – as Lord Mance JSC recently said 
regarding section 2(2) ECA – they are ‘confined in scope’.63 I argue 
that the force of section 2(1) ECA (together with other incorporating 
provisions) is such that the ECA grounds a presumption that all EU 
measures that belong to the category of legal acts that are supposed 
to have effect in domestic law are prima facie effective in UK law (in 
the sundry ways in which they purport to be effective). In other 
words, there is a presumption of effect of EU law in UK law. This 
presumption stems from the ECA and should not be conflated with 
distinct EU-law presumption of validity of EU measures often 
stressed in CJEU jurisprudence64 or with the EU principle of 
effectiveness. The domestic presumption of applicability is certainly 
supported by the EU presumption of validity, but has a distinct 
ground in the legislative choice of Parliament. This is important, 
because the EU presumption of validity could not apply beyond the 
                                                      
61 Pham (n 2) [90]; Miller (n 2) [61], [65], [80]-[81].  
62 Pham (n 2) [91]. 
63 United States v Nolan [2015] UKSC 63; [2015] 3 WLR 1105 [62]. 
64 See, e.g., Case C-137/92P Commission of the European Communities v 
BASF AG [1994] ECR I-2555, para 48. 
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scope of incorporation through the ECA (being part of EU law, it is 
itself in need of incorporation).  
Why would we then think that Parliament chose in the ECA to 
grant the presumption of effect even beyond the scope of the general 
limits of incorporation? After all, the ECA does not ground the 
presumption in express terms. The reason is in breadth of 
incorporating provisions of the ECA, which give EU law an 
exceptionally significant role in UK legal system. This point was 
made forcefully, perhaps even too forcefully, by the Supreme Court 
in Miller.65 EU institutions in their legislative, executive and judicial 
capacity, are – in the virtue of the ECA – authoritative in UK law. 
Hence, it is implicit in the incorporating scheme that their 
authoritative actions benefit from a presumption of binding force at 
least as strong as those of domestic executive bodies. This 
presumption stands even when an EU measure infringes the limits of 
incorporation. 
How strong is the presumption? There are several possibilities. A 
strong view would be to see it by analogy with the force of court 
orders: they can only be set aside in a proper judicial procedure and 
cannot be disregarded by the addressees even when manifestly 
erroneous. A moderate view would see the presumption as roughly 
equivalent to the ‘the presumption that delegated legislation is valid 
unless and until declared invalid’.66 This position would in many 
circumstances have similar consequences as the strong view, but with 
a qualification that the presumption may not apply (against private 
persons and public bodies) when the breach of a general limit of 
incorporation is manifest.67 A weak view would be that the 
presumption should be given significant weight in cases of 
uncertainty as to whether an EU measure violates one of the general 
limits of incorporation. It is beyond my ambitions in this paper to 
                                                      
65 See n 7 above. 
66 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 1) [1990] 2 AC 
85 (142) (Lord Bridge). 
67 By analogy with Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143 
(157)-(158) (Lord Irvine of Lairg LC); F Hoffmann La Roche & Co AG v 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295 (366) (Lord 
Diplock). See also, Smith v East Elloe Rural District Council [1956] AC 736 
(769)-(770) (Lord Radcliffe); Interfact Ltd v Liverpool City Council [2011] 
QB 744 [37] (Lord Judge CJ). 
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resolve this issue and hence in what follows I will accept the weak 
option as it is sufficient to develop my point that EU law may be 
effective beyond the general limits of incorporation. 
Concluding, unless a UK court is satisfied that one of the general 
limits of incorporation has been breached, the court is under a 
domestic legal duty, grounded ultimately in the ECA 1972 or in 
another Act of Parliament, to give the kind of effect to the EU 
measure in question that EU law requires. Arguably, the general 
limits are indeterminate enough as to leave a considerable scope of 
uncertainty. The presumption of effect should be an important factor 
in judicial reasoning in the face of such uncertainty. This is not, 
however, the whole story. As I argue below, sometimes a court will at 
least have a permission to apply EU law even when it is beyond the 
general limits of incorporation. 
III. Domestic effect of EU law violating the general limits 
EU measures that appear not to be effective in UK law because they 
violate one of the general limits of incorporation may still be in some 
way binding on a UK court.68 I will refer to ‘prima facie 
non-incorporation’ to mean a situation where an EU measure 
violates one of the general limits of incorporation through the 
ECA 1972 as discussed in the previous section, e.g. when it is 
incompatible with a UK fundamental constitutional principle. Not 
every case of prima facie non-incorporation is a case of 
all-things-considered non-incorporation. In other words, just 
because a general limit of incorporation is violated by an EU measure, 
it does not follow that domestic courts are under a duty not to apply 
the measure.   
This does not mean that there are some anchors for binding effect 
of EU law in UK law that are independent of any statute, and in 
particular that such independent anchors are to be found in the 
common law. The principle remains that non-UK law can only affect 
rights and duties in UK law if there is a statutory anchor.69 Note that 
even the presumption that Parliament legislates in a way consistent 
                                                      
68 On my usage of the notion of ‘EU measures’, see n 51 above. 
69 See the case law cited in n 4; for a discussion, see Sales and Clement (n 5). 
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with the UK’s international obligations (including the 
non-incorporated ones) is a presumption of statutory interpretation. 
Hence, any binding effect of an EU measure that violates one of the 
general limits of incorporation has to be grounded in a statute. One 
possibility is that a statute other than the ECA provides for such 
effect. Another possibility is that the ECA itself, interpreted 
consistently with certain constitutional principles (e.g. the rule of 
law), provides for effect beyond the general limits. The second option 
is particularly important as it suggests that the fundamental rights 
and fundamental principles reasoning applied to the ECA may push 
in both directions: to limit and to expand domestic legal effect of EU 
law. In practical terms, the presumption of effect of EU law counts in 
favour of accepting that the ECA provides an anchor for domestic 
effect of any EU measure (it may help to tip the scale). 
Having this general framework in mind, I now turn to a 
discussion of several possible grounds for effect of EU law even when 
it violates one of the general limits of incorporation. The selection is 
not supposed to be exhaustive, but merely illustrative. As a 
particularly good example, I first introduce the severability 
argument, grounded in separation of powers concerns about the 
limits of judicial power. Subsequently, I suggest some other possible 
considerations that may plausibly figure in interpretation of the 
legislative choice made by Parliament in enacting the ECA. 
A. The severability argument 
The severability argument I introduce in this subsection is based on 
the assumption that in enacting the ECA 1972 Parliament intended 
to modify the application of the principle of the separation of powers 
only in favour of effectiveness of EU law. More specifically, if as a 
result of the ECA the judges have a power to make some choices 
otherwise reserved for the legislative branch, they only have such 
power to ensure legal effect of EU law, not otherwise. This matters, 
because not to apply an EU measure in some cases arguably entails 
making a choice to change the law that normally is reserved for a 
legislature. When would this be the case? By analogy with Lord 
Mance’s JSC judgment in Chester, it may be argued that this could 
happen when some EU legal content that violates the general limits 
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of incorporation is not severable from EU legal content that is within 
those limits.70 
Chester concerned voting eligibility of prisoners serving life 
sentences for murder. The discussion that is relevant here comes 
from the obiter part of Lord Mance’s JSC judgment, where he 
considers the hypothetical situation of EU law granting a right to 
vote.71 According to Lord Mance JSC, even then it would be beyond 
the powers of a UK court to disapply the statute that prohibits 
prisoner voting.72 No court could simply disapply the prohibition in 
its entirety, because even according to the far-reaching case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (which informs EU law) it is clear 
that ‘a ban on eligibility will be justified in respect of a very significant 
number of convicted prisoners’.73 Hence, by disapplying the whole 
prohibition, a court would be going beyond what is necessary to bring 
UK law into conformity with a requirement of EU law. And that is 
something UK courts have no power to do.  
It is also not open to a UK court to do anything short of 
disapplication of the whole ban.74 Courts could neither read into the 
impugned statute some indeterminate criteria of voting eligibility 
(perhaps something like ‘to the extent required by EU law’) nor 
impose their own version of determinate criteria.75 The former would 
go against clear legislative intent (contra legem), which is a limit of 
conforming interpretation.76 The latter would involve the sort of 
choices that, under the British constitution, are reserved for 
Parliament. As a result, all that a court could do would be to issue a 
declaration of incompatibility of UK law with EU law.77 It would be a 
categorically different sort of a declaration of incompatibility from 
                                                      
70 Chester (n 4). 
71 ibid [69]-[83]. 
72 ibid [73]-[74]. 
73 ibid [73]. 
74 ibid [74]. 
75 ibid [74]. 
76 See, e.g., United States v Nolan (n 63) [14] (Lord Mance JSC); Case 
C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentaci n SA 
[1990] ECR I-4135, para 8.  
77 Chester (n 4) [72]. 
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the one in the EOC case, because it would have no legal effect.78 In 
particular, a Chester declaration could not be relied upon by anyone 
as authority for setting aside the UK ban on prisoner voting. 
By analogy, Chester suggests the following limitation of the duty 
not to apply an EU measure that violates one of the general limits of 
incorporation: 
(1) not applying the whole measure would also mean not 
applying the legal content that is within the general limits of 
incorporation and 
(2) severance is impossible. 
What I mean by ‘severance’ is such a construction of an impugned 
measure that saves all that is within the scope of incorporation and 
sets aside all that is beyond. On a very schematic example: if EU law 
requires 100, but it is beyond the limits of incorporation for it to 
require more than 70, a domestic court should construe EU law as 
requiring 70. The concept of severability is recognised both in UK 
law and in EU law as limiting the necessity to quash (to annul in full) 
unlawful delegated legislation (or other legal acts).79 Both UK law and 
EU law apply a test of ‘substantial severability’.80 UK law also has a 
test of ‘textual severability’, also known as the ‘blue pencil’ test, but it 
is unclear whether textual and substantial tests have to be both 
                                                      
78 This follows from what Lord Mance JSC says at [74]: ‘Thereafter, it would 
be for the United Kingdom Parliament to address the position and make 
such legislative changes as were considered appropriate.’ Conf. R v 
Secretary of State for Employment Ex p Equal Opportunities Commission 
[1995] 1 AC 1 (27) (Lord Keith of Kinkel). 
79 See, e.g., DPP v Hutchinson [1990] 2 AC 783; HM Treasury v Ahmed 
[2008] EWCA Civ 1187; [2009] 3 WLR 25 [52]-[53] (Sir Anthony Clarke 
MR); Case C-425/13 European Commission v Council of the European 
Union EU:C:2015:483; [2016] 1 C.M.L.R. 11, para 94. See also AW Bradley, 
‘Judicial Enforcement of Ultra Vires Byelaws: The Proper Scope of 
Severance’ [1990] Public Law 293, 299–300. 
80 DPP v Hutchinson (n 79) (804F) (Lord Bridge of Harwich). Similarly, the 
CJEU held that: 
‘Review of whether the contested provisions are severable requires 
consideration of their scope, in order to be able to assess whether their 
annulment would alter the spirit and substance of the decision 
challenged …’ 
European Commission v Council of the European Union (n 79), para 94. 
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satisfied or whether substantial severability is sufficient.81 Severance 
is only possible when a court can obey fully the power-conferring 
authority (in our case: the incorporating authority) by giving partial 
effect to what can be saved from a breach of the power (violation of 
the general limits of incorporation) without usurping a legislative 
role. 
I am not concerned here with the details of how the tests of 
severability are supposed to be applied. What is important for my 
argument, is that if lack of severability may mean that an otherwise 
non-incorporated EU measure is to be given effect by UK courts, 
then this must be grounded in a reading of the ECA as consistent with 
the principle of the separation of powers (and perhaps other 
fundamental principles). As Lord Bridge and Lord Lowry stress in a 
landmark case on severability, the courts have no jurisdiction to 
‘legislate’ or to ‘modify and adapt the law’.82 It is easy to see why the 
severability point applies straightforwardly to Chester:83 for a UK 
court to disapply an Act of Parliament to a greater extent than 
necessary to bring about conformity of domestic law with EU law, 
would be a violation of parliamentary sovereignty. However, in the 
present context, the legislature a domestic court would be going 
against is not Parliament, but the EU law maker (or an EU institution 
in the case of non-legislative acts). Hence, even though the argument 
about courts not having powers to legislate still has some strength, it 
is not immediately obvious that this sort of a separation of powers 
concern would be weightier than the reason behind the general limit 
of incorporation violated in a given case.  
The issue of severability shows that there is a need for balancing 
of fundamental principles in the light of which the incorporating 
provisions of the ECA are to be interpreted. The separation of 
powers, especially when it protects encroachment of UK courts on 
the powers of EU institutions, may lose out in competition with, for 
example, the force of Parliament’s choice expressly to exclude some 
parts of EU law from the scope of incorporation. This frame helps to 
                                                      
81 ibid (804) (Lord Bridge of Harwich); (820) (Lord Lowry); HM Treasury v 
Ahmed (n 79) [53] (Sir Anthony Clarke MR). 
82 DPP v Hutchinson (n 79) (804C) (Lord Bridge of Harwich), (819B) (Lord 
Lowry). 
83 Note that Lord Mance JSC does not expressly refer in Chester to the 
notion of severability. 
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explain what happened in Assange: the Supreme Court found it 
possible to sever the non-incorporated legal content of the Treaty on 
European Union from the part incorporated by the ECA.84 Lord 
Mance JSC rejected arguments of counsel, which may be 
characterized as severability arguments. For instance, it was argued 
that not to give effect to some EU legal content that is excluded in the 
ECA would entail not giving effect to judgments of the CJEU, which 
are binding under section 3(1) ECA.85 The counsel also tried to 
employ the principle of sincere cooperation in a similar matter.86 
Lord Mance JSC rejected both points as inconsistent with the correct 
interpretation of the ECA, both in literal terms and in the light of 
constitutional principle.87 
In accordance with my answer to Gordon’s worry about 
fundamental principles reasoning in statutory interpretation and 
parliamentary sovereignty (sec. II.A.2), the problem of balancing 
should be approached by asking which principle Parliament 
considered as weightier when enacting the ECA. Of course, in some, 
if not many, cases this may be difficult to determine, but not always. 
As my purpose in this paper is only to provide a general framework 
to conceptualise the problem of limits of incorporation of EU law, 
I will not discuss the practical consequences in more detail.  
B. Other grounds for effect of EU law beyond the general limits 
Given the important role the principle of the separation of powers 
has been playing in recent UK constitutional history, there are good 
reasons to think that in enacting the ECA 1972 Parliament did not 
intend to derogate from it more than necessary to achieve workable 
incorporation of European law. The same may be said about the 
principle of the rule of law and about some other fundamental 
features of the domestic legal landscape, like the doctrine of 
precedent. It is not my ambition to provide a comprehensive account 
of which rules Parliament did not derogate from in the ECA and how 
exactly are they to be balanced against each other. I merely aim to 
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show that it is a potentially fruitful avenue for lawyers and for the 
courts to explore.  
The doctrine of precedent is a good starting point. Domestic 
hierarchies of precedent and judicial authority have mainly been seen 
as a problem from the perspective of effectiveness and uniformity of 
EU law.88 In the UK context, it has been argued that the ECA does 
not derogate from the pre-ECA shape of the doctrine of precedent.89 
In Dar Al Arkan, Andrew Smith J argued forcefully on the basis of 
the ECA that the High Court is bound by Court of Appeal precedent, 
even if the precedent is erroneous in the light of subsequent CJEU 
case law.90 The conclusions that the judge arrived at are hard to 
square with CJEU case law, but that may merely show that on the Dar 
Al Arkan view the EU principle of effectiveness as construed by the 
CJEU is not fully incorporated in UK law.  
However, the strength of the doctrine of precedent may also 
protect domestic effectiveness of EU law. It may constrain the power 
of a later court to disapply an EU measure accepted as applicable in a 
previous judgment of a higher court (or of a different panel of the 
same court, in the case of the Court of Appeal). This example shows 
that reading the ECA as consistent even with one specific 
fundamental rule may cut both ways: sometimes providing reasons 
not to apply an EU measure, but sometimes providing strong reasons 
to apply. The doctrine of precedent may be particularly significant on 
the second front. A lower court will not easily depart from, for 
instance, Supreme Court precedent, even when the lower court is 
convinced that the Supreme Court got it wrong by holding an EU 
measure as effective in UK law. 
The rule of law may also be seen as pushing interpretation of the 
ECA is both directions. On one hand, the rule of law grounds a 
principle of legality according to which exercises of conferred powers 
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must stay within the limits of those powers.91 This counts in favour 
of setting aside, for instance, ultra vires decisions of the CJEU. On the 
other hand, there is a principle of legal certainty that may strongly 
support upholding an otherwise suspicious (prima facie 
non-incorporated) EU measure when the law’s subjects have already 
arranged their affairs in reliance on that measure.  
All this is not to say that it is possible, for the purposes of 
interpreting the ECA, to choose between the principles in the 
abstract. The point is that the principles need to be balanced when 
assessing what the ECA requires in respect to a specific EU measure 
given the relevant context. It may be uncontroversial, for instance, 
that Parliament that enacted the ECA 1972 did not intend to abrogate 
the rule-of-law principles. This fact provides a basis for employing 
the fundamental principles reasoning in interpreting what the ECA 
requires. However, the application of this kind of reasoning is bound 
to involve discretion or, perhaps more accurately, judgment.92 For 
example, perhaps there are cases where disruption to legal certainty 
would be so great that a UK court would be all-things-considered 
justified in refusing to set aside an ultra vires EU measure. 
When a court is faced with an EU measure that violates one of the 
general limits of incorporation, but is still domestically effective, it 
may be appropriate for the court to notice the violation in its 
judgment. Such judicial notice of prima-facie incompatibility would 
be importantly different from an EOC declaration of incompatibility 
or from declarations under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998.93 
It would have no legal effect, and hence it could not constitute a 
breach of EU law. However, given that Parliament is the only UK 
authority with a power to remedy merely prima facie 
non-incorporation, it could decide to take action in response to such 
judicial notice. Parliament could, for instance, bar the domestic effect 
of the EU measure in question or provide express statutory basis for 
its binding force in UK law. 
                                                      
91 See, e.g., R (Corbett) v Restormel BC [2001] EWCA Civ 330; [2001] 1 PLR 
108 [16] (Schiemann LJ). 
92 Conf. ibid [29] (Sedley LJ). 
93 R. v Secretary of State for Employment Ex p. Equal Opportunities 
Commission (n 78). 
[April 2017] Judicial Duty Not to Apply EU Law 29 
 
 
IV. The EU tools for avoidance of incompatibility 
Even though my chief concern in this paper is the legal position 
under UK law, the picture would be considerably skewed without 
taking the EU context into account. The purpose of this section is 
briefly to present the ways in which EU law itself strives to avoid 
incompatibility with domestic rules of fundamental or constitutional 
importance. This is salient because at least some potential cases of 
non-incorporation may be resolved through institutional interaction 
of UK courts and the CJEU. Also, in procedural terms, I accept that 
UK courts are under a duty to issue a preliminary reference to the 
CJEU in all but very few categories of cases of potential 
non-incorporation.  
A. EU justifications of prima facie incompatible domestic measures  
I begin by considering how flexible EU law is in accommodating 
constitutional variety in domestic law in application of primary EU 
law. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) 
grounds the possibility of justifications of non-compliance with some 
of its core requirements (e.g. freedom of movement of persons), 
which include ‘public policy’ considerations (notably in Articles 36, 
45, 52 and 65 TFEU). Those provisions tend to be read in CJEU case 
law and in the literature in the light of the Article 4(2) of the Treaty 
on European Union (‘TEU’) that states that the Union shall respect, 
among other things, ‘national identities’ of the Member States.94 The 
CJEU recognized among such justifications protection of national 
languages and the republican character of the state (including the 
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abolition of nobility).95  There is also case law that has reaches similar 
conclusions but does not reference ‘national identity’ of a Member 
State. Probably the best know case of this kind is Omega, where the 
CJEU held that  
Community law does not preclude an economic activity 
consisting of the commercial exploitation of games 
simulating acts of homicide from being made subject to a 
national prohibition measure adopted on grounds of 
protecting public policy by reason of the fact that that 
activity is an affront to human dignity.96 
It is true that when no Treaty-based justification is to be found and 
the EU Treaties clearly require something of a Member State, then as 
a matter of EU law it is EU measures that should be given effect, even 
in precedence over domestic constitutional rules, no matter how 
fundamental.97 
B. The scope of the grounds for annulment under Article 263 TFEU 
EU law consists not only of the Treaties themselves, but also of an 
immense edifice of secondary law. Article 263 TFEU provides for an 
action for annulment of much of secondary law 
on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an 
essential procedural requirement, infringement of the 
Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or 
misuse of powers. 
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The scope of the grounds for annulment is rather wide.98 This is 
important not only for actions for annulment, but also when the 
CJEU is considering a preliminary reference (the Court in practice 
adopts a unified notion of grounds for invalidity of secondary EU 
law).99 Naturally, secondary EU law may only claim primacy over 
domestic law if it is valid as a matter of EU law. Hence, it may very 
well be that an EU measure that violates one of the general limits of 
incorporation under the ECA 1972 is invalid under the criteria from 
Article 263 TFEU (not only in the case of ultra vires measures). It 
would take me too far afield to consider this issue in more depth, but 
it certainly needs to be part of any practical consideration of potential 
non-incorporation of secondary EU law in UK law. 
C. Lack of UK power to invalidate EU measures; the EU-law power 
to suspend enforcement of EU measures 
Consistently with the CJEU’s judgment in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft and Foto-Frost, there is no reason to think that 
the domestic duty not to apply EU law constitutes a power to 
invalidate EU measures.100 There is no basis (and no need) for such 
power in UK law. This is so even in cases of EU measures that are 
manifestly ultra vires of the Treaties. There is no domestic need for 
invalidation, because EU law is not effective in UK law merely 
because it is considered as valid by EU institutions. EU law is effective 
in UK law because domestic statutes so provide.  
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However, UK courts have an EU-law power to suspend 
enforcement of EU measures that are unlawful according to EU law. 
Under EU law, domestic courts have a power to review EU measures 
to assess their validity and to declare them valid.101 If a domestic court 
concludes its review with a ‘serious doubts as to the validity’ of an EU 
measure, then it is not only under a duty to refer the matter to the 
CJEU, but it also has a power (subject to other conditions) to suspend 
enforcement of the impugned EU measure while the CJEU 
proceeds.102 Yes, the final determination of validity or invalidity is left 
to the CJEU, but the power of a domestic court is not trivial. It may 
even be arguable, though perhaps not very likely, that there is an EU 
law power, conferred on national courts, to disapply EU measures 
that are unlawful under EU law in some circumstances when national 
courts cannot make a reference.103 
Even when, after the CJEU makes its view known, a UK court is 
convinced that the CJEU is mistaken and that the CJEU upheld an 
ultra vires EU measure, all that the domestic court may be required 
to do is to deny the EU measure domestic effect as breaching the 
limits of incorporation from the ECA 1972. In a sense, such 
determination will entail that from the court’s perspective, EU 
institutions, including the CJEU, are mistaken not to see the EU 
measure in question as invalid. But this is different from claiming a 
power to invalidate.  
I want to stress that only clear or manifest violations of the limits 
of the EU Treaties are among the general limits of incorporation of 
EU law (see sec. II). Hence, UK courts ought to give a considerable 
leeway to the CJEU in deciding whether an EU measure is within the 
limits of the Treaties or not. Only when it is clear that the CJEU is 
mistaken, it will be open to a UK court to set aside an EU measure on 
this basis. Of course, the EU measure in question may violate other 
general limits of domestic incorporation of EU law and hence it may 
be that EU-lawfulness of the measure in question is insufficient for 
effect in UK law. 
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D. The duty to issue a preliminary reference 
The last EU law point I want to raise is the issue of a duty of a 
domestic court to issue a preliminary reference to the CJEU. 
According to Article 267 TFEU, all domestic courts may make 
preliminary references to the CJEU on matters of ‘the interpretation 
of the Treaties’ and of ‘the validity and interpretation of acts of the 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union’. Article 267 
TFEU also provides that national courts of last instance are under a 
duty to make such reference.104 What is important in the light of the 
main argument in this paper is that many issues of prima facie 
non-incorporation of EU law in UK law may be resolved through a 
preliminary reference. The CJEU may declare invalid under EU law 
an EU measure that happens also to violate one of the general limits 
of incorporation. Also, when it is a previous interpretation of EU law 
adopted by EU courts that leads to prima facie non-incorporation in 
UK law, it may be that the CJEU will reconsider its position.105 Not to 
mention the possibility that the domestic court will end up being 
convinced by the reasoning offered by the CJEU. 
The power and the duty to make references for preliminary 
rulings, in itself, does not preclude the domestic power of a UK court 
to disagree with the CJEU.106 There are two grounds for such 
disagreement: (1) the CJEU acting ultra vires of the EU Treaties, 
(2) the CJEU purporting to bind outside of the scope of section 3(1) 
of the ECA. On the first point, it may be argued that from the EU-law 
perspective, domestic courts can never disagree with the CJEU on 
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ECLI:EU:C:2013:8, paras. 62-73 
105 In HS2, Lord Neuberger PSC and Lord Mance JSC said in reference to 
what they perceived as an error in interpreting EU law by the CJEU that, 
had it been necessary to decide a case before the Supreme Court, the Justices 
would have 
wished to have the matter referred back to the European Court of 
Justice for it to reconsider, hopefully in a fully reasoned judgment of 
the Grand Chamber, the correctness of its previous decision; 
HS2 (n 2) [189]. 
106 On the limits of interpretation and force of Article 267 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, see Paul Craig and Menelaos 
Markakis, ‘Gauweiler and the Legality of Outright Monetary Transactions’ 
(2016) 41 European Law Review 4, 16.  
[April 2017] Judicial Duty Not to Apply EU Law 34 
 
 
points of EU law and it does not matter whether they think the CJEU 
is acting ultra vires, though this is controversial.107 However, the 
position under UK law is different, as was confirmed in Pham 
(see sec. II.A.1 above). This is not to say that decisions of the CJEU 
are never binding when wrong. They are only not binding, in UK law, 
when they are tainted with a special kind of error, i.e. when they are 
clearly ultra vires of the EU Treaties.108 
On the second point, it is true that section 3(1) of the ECA is to 
be read as providing that determinations of the CJEU are binding on 
UK courts as to ‘as to the meaning or effect of any of the Treaties, or 
as to the validity, meaning or effect of any EU instrument’. However, 
decisions of the CJEU are not binding on other matters. In particular, 
preliminary rulings are not binding on UK courts as to the outcome 
of a case before a UK court.109 It could be that the CJEU goes beyond 
merely providing interpretation of an EU instrument and gives 
guidance as to how a domestic court ought to decide a case whilst not 
taking into account crucial facts of the case.110 A UK court may be 
then required to decide inconsistently with the CJEU’s guidance as to 
the outcome, but consistently with the CJEU’s interpretation of EU 
law. 
Crucially, UK law does not, in principle, bar the duty of a 
domestic court to issue a preliminary reference when it suspects an 
EU measure to be invalid as a matter of EU law. To the contrary, I 
propose that UK law grounds a duty to make preliminary references 
even broader than the one found in Article 267 TFEU as interpreted 
by the CJEU. Given the strength and breadth of the incorporating 
provisions of the ECA 1972 (see sec. II.C), it should be accepted that 
in all cases of prima facie non-incorporation that possibly could be 
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resolved by the CJEU, UK courts (and certainly the Supreme Court) 
have a duty to make preliminary reference to the CJEU. This is a 
manifestation of ‘the spirit of co-operation’ present in UK law that 
Lord Mance JSC mentions in Pham.111  The only cases where this duty 
may not apply are the cases of non-incorporation caused by express 
exclusions of parts of EU law in the ECA 1972, repeal of the 
incorporating provisions of the ECA or ‘notwithstanding’ legislation. 
However, if exclusion, repeal or statutory derogation are not 
universal there may still be issues that interaction with the CJEU 
could resolve. 
 
 
V. Conclusions 
I have argued that the general limits of incorporation of EU law 
identified in recent case law should be seen as prima facie, because it 
is possible that an EU measure that violated one or more of them 
remains effective in UK law. What has not yet been adequately 
noticed by the courts and the academic literature is that the 
fundamental constitutional principles reasoning applied to 
interpretation of the ECA in cases like Thoburn and HS2 may push 
in a direction of strengthening or broadening of domestic effect of 
EU law. Fundamental principles are in this context a double-edged 
sword. Another point I have stressed is that EU law itself has an array 
of tools to mitigate the risk of incompatibility between EU law and 
domestic constitutional fundamentals.  
Only when all those domestic and European devices are 
exhausted or inapplicable there may arise an issue of genuine non-
incorporation of EU law in UK law. What is a court to do then? One 
view is to deny the premise: all situations of incompatibility are to be 
resolved according to the principle of supremacy of EU law. To hold 
this view would require more bullet-biting than anyone could 
stomach. For example, it would entail that no matter how manifestly 
ultra vires a decision of the CJEU would be, it would be binding in 
UK law (see sec. II.A.1). Hence, there can be little doubt that it 
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sometimes is the case that a court is under a duty not to apply EU law. 
The already mentioned judgments of Baroness Hale DPSC and Lord 
Mance JSC in Assange provide a clear and eminently convincing 
example.112 Once an EU measure is beyond one of the general limits 
of incorporation and there are no legal reasons in UK law that could 
ground its domestic effect or such reasons are outweighed, then a 
court is under a duty not to apply EU law. And if a court is under the 
duty, then this is what the court must do.  
Fiat justitia, ruat caelum may sound frightening, but the heavens 
are unlikely to fall just because UK courts sometimes have a duty not 
to apply EU law.113 It is true that refusal to give effect to an EU 
measure may have grave political and financial consequences. 
Among those possible consequences are infringement proceedings 
under Article 258 TFEU, financial penalties under Article 260 TFEU 
and even Francovich or Köbler liability.114 However, the consequences 
of setting aside EU law are not always grave, or at least not 
immediately. Given the practice of the EU Commission and of the 
CJEU in respect to Articles 258 and 260 TFEU, it is unlikely that any 
particular court judgment will have infringement proceedings as its 
consequence.115 Instead, the issue is likely to be framed as legislative 
inaction or erroneous practice in the administration of law.116 What 
this means is that any court, even the Supreme Court, may be 
reasonably certain that if it refuses to apply EU law, Parliament will 
have ample time to legislate to remedy the incompatibility (if it so 
chooses) before the Commission will be satisfied that either of the 
grounds for invoking Article 258 TFEU has arisen.  
In terms of Francovich liability, it is at least arguable that if the 
EU standard by which UK law could be judged as giving rise to 
liability is not itself effective in UK law, then there is no reason for 
UK court to recognize Francovich liability in such situation. The 
same applies to Köbler liability for judgments of domestic courts of 
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final instance. Finally, disapplication of EU law need not have any 
consequences of the sort discussed here at all. This is not to say that 
EU institutions would take no notice of, for example, a 
well-publicized Supreme Court judgment refusing to apply EU law, 
but there is clearly a good deal of friction the system can bear. 
There may be a question as to whether the result of the Brexit 
referendum affects the legal position discussed here. Tobias Lock 
suggested that it may be that EU law will lose ‘its bite’ in the UK 
following the vote to leave.117 He asked whether UK courts will ‘show 
the same commitment’ to EU law as they have until now.118 Without 
trying to predict what the courts will do in practice, I will make two 
observations. First, at least the Supreme Court continues to apply EU 
law without any change of course due to the referendum.119 Second, 
neither the referendum, nor any action of the Crown (short of 
withdrawing from EU Treaties), can affect the legislative choice that 
Parliament made by enacting the ECA 1972. Hence, the UK law that 
controls application of EU law has not changed.  
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